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EGO INVOLVEMENT IN A HEDONIC SITUATION 
WITH DISCONFIRMED EXPECTANCIES _
- - CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM
In recent years, psychologists have been concerned with 
experimentally examining the dynamics of change in attitudes 
and opinions. Within this framework, Festinger (1957) 
offered a theory of cognitive dissonance. He proposed that 
the existence of incompatible cognitions is a motivating 
force which impels the organism toward attaining cognitive 
balance. Cognition, for Festinger, refers to any idea, 
belief, or opinion that an individual may have.
The basic assumptions of this cognitive dissonance 
theory are :
1. The existence of dissonance, being 
psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the 
individual to attempt to reduce the dissonance and 
achieve consonance.
2. When dissonance is present, in addition to 
trying to reduce it, the person will actively avoid 
situations and information which would likely increase 
the dissohance.
3. Manifestations of these pressures include 
behavior changes, changes in'cognition, and circumspect 
exposure to new information and new opinions (Festinger, 
1957, pp. 30-31).
2Chapanis and Chapanls reviewed the extensive volume of 
research that was inspired by Festinger*s theory and criti­
cized the supportive evidence as being limited by the 
following :
1. The experimental manipulations are usually 
so confounded that no valid conclusions can be drawn 
from the data.
2. A number of fundamental methodological 
inadequacies in the analysis of the results, e.g., 
rejection of cases and faulty statistical analysis 
of the data, vitiate the findings (196^, p. 1).
The conclusion that Chapanis and Chapanis drew from 
their investigation is that the evidence that had so far 
been offered in support of dissonance theory was incon­
clusive.
Dissonance and disconfirmed expectancies. Aronson and 
Carlsmith (1962) suggested that cognitive dissonance occurs 
most often when a person’s behavior is at variance with his 
self concept. In support of this position, they reported 
that students who expected to perform poorly on a certain 
task, but who actually did well, expressed more dissonance 
(discomfort) than subjects who expected to perform poorly 
and who did perform poorly. This study dealt with a specific 
and limited kind of expectancy, i.e., an expectancy which 
involved the individual's self conception regarding a 
particular task.
Carlsmith and Aronson (1963) attempted to generalize 
the above findings to any situation involving an expectancy. 
They suggested that dissonance is aroused whenever an event
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occurs which disconfirms a strong expectancy. They examined 
the hedonic consequences of disconfirmed and confirmed ex­
pectancies, assuming that, if dissonance-does arise from the 
disconfirmation of an expectancy, then the resulting per­
ception should he hedonically negative or unpleasant. That 
is, if a person expects a certain event (X) to occur, and a 
different event (Y) occurs, he should experience dissonance. 
Therefore, he should perceive (Y) to be less pleasant than 
if he had no expectancy toward (X).
They had their subjects taste and rate a random order 
of sweet and bitter solutions. The experimenters used 
subtle signals to induce expectancies on the part of the 
subjects as to whether the next solution would be sweet or 
bitter. By giving an inappropriate signal, they attempted 
to disconfirm the subjects' expectancies. According to 
dissonance theory, this would produce unpleasant ratings.
Carlsmith and Aronson reported that when the subjects' 
expectancies were disconfirmed, both for sweet and bitter 
solutions, the subjects judged the solutions to be more un­
pleasant than when they had no expectancy of occurrence for 
the solution. They interpreted these results as being 
supportive of dissonance theory.
Taylor (1965) criticized Carlsmith and Aronson for 
neglecting physiological variables which may have influenced 
their results, discarding subjects, using unnecessary com­
plications in the attempt to arouse expectancies, and for
4using an inadequate method of statistical analysis. In 
correcting for these deficiencies, Taylor experimentally 
re-examined their work and found no significant differences 
between judgments where expectancies were disconfirmed and 
judgments where expectancies were confirmed.
Mace (1966) criticized both of the above studies for 
incorporating the use of two rating scales: one for bitter
solutions and one for sweet solutions. He claimed that the 
use of one rating scale for both pleasant and unpleasant 
solutions would allow for a more valid hedonic judgment, 
since this procedure would allow the subjects to judge sweet 
solutions as being more pleasant than bitter solutions.
Also, Mace criticized both of the above studies for having 
an unreliable agent (saccharine) as the basis for sweet 
solutions. He re-examined this affective judgment situation, 
using 7 Up and quinine water for the pleasant and unpleasant 
solutions respectively, and using the color of the solution 
as the basis for establishing expectancies. He reported 
that when expectancies were disconfirmed a contrast effect 
was demonstrated. That is, when the subject expected a 
solution to be pleasant and found it to be unpleasant, it 
was perceived as being more unpleasant than when there was 
no basis for an expectancy; when the subject expected the 
solution to be unpleasant and it was perceived as being 
pleasant, he judged it to be more pleasant than when there 
was no basis for an expectancy. In contrast to the report
5of Carlsmith and Aronson (1963)» these results do not sup­
port the idea that dissonance was aroused in this hedonic 
judgment situation. Mace interpreted these results within 
the framework offered by Sherif and Hovland (1961) in their 
discussion of assimilation and contrast effects in attitude 
change. According to Sherif.and Hovland, if a stimulus is 
perceived as being quite discrepant with a reference, a 
contrast effect occurs. There is then a tendency to push 
the judgment farther away from the reference.
Ego involvement. Ego involvement has been defined as 
"the arousal, singly or in combination, of the individual's 
commitments or stands in the context of appropriate situa­
tions, be they interpersonal relations or a judgment task 
in actual life or an experiment" (Sherif, Sherif, & 
Nebergall, 1965» p. 65). Sherif» Sherif, and Nebergall go 
on to say that:
The person is ego-involved when any one of these 
ties and commitments, singly or in combination, is 
situationally aroused. Such ego involvements are 
manifested unmistakably in the reactions of the 
individual, in the evaluative adjectives he used, 
and in the corrective measures he takes, for example, 
when confronted by statements insulting his family, 
his party, or his church (1965» p. 65).
A number of studies have demonstrated that the judg­
ments of ego involved subjects differ from the judgments of 
subjects who are not ego involved (Harvey » 1953» Holt,
19^5; Sherif & Hovland, 1961).
Ego involvement has been operationally defined as 
follows :
Ihe degree of involvement and personal commitment 
on the issue of communication can be operationally 
defined by comparing the sizes of (number of positions 
in) the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non­
commitment. Specifically, the more involved and 
personally committed the individual is on the issue, 
the greater the latitude of rejection is in relation 
to the latitude of acceptance, the number on which 
he remains noncommittal approaching zero (Sherif 
et al., 1965» p. 1^).
The latitude of acceptance refers to that position that is 
most acceptable plus other acceptable positions. The lati­
tude of rejection refers to the most objectionable position 
plus other objectionable positions. Also, there are 
positions that the individual neither accepts nor rejects 
which compose the latitude of noncommitment. —  -
The present study 
In the study by Mace (1966) the subjects were told that 
they were participating in an experiment that would help to 
determine the extent to which different chemical formula­
tions affect the taste of several soft drinks. There was no 
attempt to provide any kind of "pay-off" for the subjects 
having their expectancies confirmed. Carlsmith and Aronson. 
(1963) paid their subjects $.50 for being correct in their 
guess as to the nature of the next solution and charged them 
$1.00 for being incorrect. Even though the subjects knew 
that they could not owe money at the end of the experiment, 
they could win more money by being consistently correct. 
Also, the subjects were told that the ability to notice such 
cues as the signals used in the experiment to induce
7expectancies w^s related to personal sensitivity. Both of 
these factors qiay have served to increase the subjects' in­
volvement in the situation, although there was no attempt 
to assess any degree of involvement by the experimenters.
Such a difference in involvement might be responsible for 
the difference between the results of Carlsmith and Aronson 
and those reported by Mace. That is, perhaps with a relative 
lack of involvement there is a contrast effect and with some 
degree of personal involvement there is a dissonance effect. 
Therefore, both ego-involved and non-involved subjects were 
introduced into this affective judgment situation in the 
present study.
Another variable that was introduced into this study, 
in line with the idea of possible differences in focus, was 
the use of two rating scales. It occurred to this author 
that, from personal experience, there seems to be a dif­
ference between the hedonic nature of a stimulus and the 
hedonic reaction to the total situation. For example, with 
a disconfirmed expectancy, one might find that the general 
feeling toward the whole situation of making a judgment is 
more pleasant or unpleasant than the hedonic perception of 
the stimulus itself. The use of two rating scales would 
allow the subjects to express separately a reaction to the 
stimulus and a reaction to personal feelings about the 
situation. This possibility was not presented to either the 
subjects of Carlsmith and Aronson or to the subjects of Mace.
8Specifically, It was thoijght that the difference between the 
two above reports might be that in one the subjects were 
expressing a contrast reaction to a stimulus situation and 
in the other a dissonance reaction based on their feeling 
tone in the total judgment situation of a disconfirmed 
expectancy.
Also, it seemed possible that such a difference in 
reaction might vary with degree of involvement. It could be 
that ego-involvement forces the individual into a judgment 
based more on his personal feelings than on the stimulus 
characteristics. If the effect of disconfirmation of an 
expectancy is only a contrast effect and if the individual 
judges his feelings separately from the stimulus character­
istics, the only differences associated with the degree of 
involvement would be in the strength of the reaction. On 
the other hand, even though the individual can still sep­
arate his personal feelings from the stimulus characteris­
tics, it might be that a significant degree of ego- 
involvement is necessary in order for cognitive dissonance 
to occur. In this case, a highly involved individual should 
show dissonance in his personal feelings while a non- 
involved individual would show contrast. Therefore, it was 
important in this study to examine the effect of ego- 
involvement on the two scales, or two hedonic measures, 
simultaneously.
9With the use of two hedonic scales, one for the 
stimulus reactions and one for the feeling tone reactions, 
the following specific patterns of change in ratings were 
looked for in this study:
1. Contrast— if the subject expects an experience to 
be pleasant but it is unpleasant, the experience would be 
rated as more unpleasant than if he had no expectancy. If 
the experience is expected to be unpleasant but it is 
pleasant, it would be rated as more pleasant than if he had 
no expectancy.
2. Dissonance— because any disconfirmed expectancy 
would be uncomfortable, disconfirmed expectancies for both 
pleasant and unpleasant experiences would be rated as_more 
unpleasant than if there was no expectancy.
Although this procedure and scaling technique vould 
also show assimilation, there was no evidence of an assimi­
lation effect in the previous studies. Assimilation would 
be indicated by changes in rating exactly opposite to those 
that would indicate contrast.
Figure 1 shows the direction of change that would indi­
cate either a contrast or a dissonance effect. These same 
patterns of change apply to both the feeling tone ratings 
and the stimulus ratings. However, each scale had its own 
reference points (ratings for both the unpleasant and 
pleasant solutions when there was no basis for an ex­
pectancy) .
10
UNPLEASANT NEUTRAL PLEASANT
( 1 ) DP^ G SU SP  ^ D^U
(2) DP^  ^ SU DU^ ^ SP
(3) DP^^ ^ ° SU SP G ^
D U ^
(h) DP^ d______________su SP 0__ ^
DÜ. ------- --
Fig. 1. Expected changes in hedonic rating due to 
contrast and dissonance. (1) pure contrast, (2) pure 
dissonance, (3) strong contrast, weak dissonance, (^) 
strong dissonance, weak contrast. The abbreviations used 
ar e :
SP— standard pleasant rating 
SU— standard unpleasant rating 
DP— disconfirmed pleasant expectancy 
DU— disconfirmed unpleasant expectancy 
c— contrast 
d— dissonance effect
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The separation of stimulus ratings and feeling tone 
ratings, the disconfirmation of both pleasant and unpleasant 
expectancies, and the use of both an ego-involved group and 
a non-involved group permits the examination of a large 
number of hypotheses regarding specific combinations of 
effects. However, for the purposes of this study, the 
following were the pertinent basic hypotheses :
1. The basic reaction is a contrast effect and ego-' 
involvement simply increases the strength of the reaction. 
Both ego-involved and non-involved subjects will show a 
contrast effect on both the stimulus scale and the feeling 
tone scale, but the reaction will be greater for the ego- 
involved subjects.
2. Dissonance requires, or is more likely to occur 
under, conditions of ego-involvement. On both scales the 
ego-involved subjects will show a dissonance effect, while 
non-involved subjects will show a contrast effect.
3. Dissonance applies only to judgments involving 
personal feelings of commitment. Both the ego-involved and 
non-involved subjects will show a contrast effect in their 
stimulus ratings and a dissonance effect in their feeling 
tone ratings.
Combinations of these effects (including the combination 
of contrast and dissonance effects in a single rating) could 
also occur. Figure 1 shows examples of several combination 
effects.
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
SuP.iects
Nine statements pertaining to the importance of grades 
in college (see Table 1) were chosen from a group of 27 such 
statements that were given to 15 graduate students, who were 
asked to sort these statements into separate piles. They 
were told that they could use as many piles as they felt 
necessary in order to position the various statements along 
a continuum ranging from feeling that grades were very im­
portant to a position of feeling that grades were unimportant 
in college. After each of the judges had finished this task, 
a yardstick was used to measure the distance between piles. 
The nine statements that were selected were those that most 
closely approximated an interval scale including the two 
extreme statements which were consistently judged to be 
positioned at the two ends of the continuum.
Students enrolled in introductory psychology courses 
at the University of Oklahoma were then given the task of 
evaluating these nine statements. Each of 128 students was
12
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Table 1
Statements used for Subject Selection
a. There is no doubt that obtaining good grades is the 
most important aspect of college.
b. Obtaining good grades is one of the most important
aspects of college.
c. Obtaining good grades is often a very important 
aspect of college.
d. Obtaining good grades is sometimes a very important 
aspect of college.
e. It is difficult to say whether or not obtaining good 
grades is an important aspect of college.
f. Obtaining good grades is sometimes not a very im­
portant aspect of college.
g. Obtaining good grades is often not a very important 
aspect of college.
h. Obtaining good grades is one of the least important 
aspects of college.
i. There is no doubt that obtaining good grades is the 
least important aspect of college.
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given a complete set of the nine statements copied on each 
of four sheets of paper assembled into a booklet. This pro­
cedure was patterned after that of Sherif (1965, P» 28). On 
the first sheet the subjects were given the following in­
structions :
Below are some statements expressing various 
positions on the matter of grades in college.
1. Please read all the statements Carefully first 
before making any marks on this page.
2. Now that you have read carefully all of the 
statements TJNDEKLINE the ONE statement that comes 
closest to your position on this matter.
On the second page the subjects were instructed:
The statements below are the same as those on 
the preceding page.
1. Please read all the statements carefully again 
before making any marks on this page.
2. On the first page, you underlined _ the one 
statement that was most acceptable to you. On 
this page, CIRCLE the letter of any other state­
ment or statements that are acceptable to you.
On the third page they were instructed:
The statements below are the same as those on 
the two preceding pages.
1. Please read through the statements again.
2. Now that you have read through the statements 
again, CROSS OUT the ONE statement that is most 
OBJECTIONABLE from your point of view.
On the fourth page the subjects were instructed:
The statements below are the same as those on 
the first three pages.
1. Read through the statements again.
■'5
2. On the preceding page you indicated the state­
ment that you disagreed with the most. On this 
page CIRCLE the letter of any other statement or 
statements that you also find objectionable.
The positions checked on the first two pages indicated 
the subject’s latitude of acceptance, while those positions 
checked on the last two pages indicated his latitude of re­
jection. Since the subject was not forced to respond to 
every statement, his latitude of noneommitment could also be 
assessed.
Subject selection. On the basis of the students' 
evaluations of these statements, 10 ego-involved males, 10 
ego-involved females, 10 uninvolved males, and 10 uninvolved 
females were selected as subjects in the experiment. In 
order for a subject to be judged to be ego-involved in this 
issue, he had to indicate rejection of at least 50^ of the 
statements. In order for a subject to have been judged to be 
uninvolved, he had to be non-committed on at least 50% of 
the statements. This 50%o criterion is stated by Sherif as 
an often used method in judgment studies (1965? P» 30).
Also, for the ego-involved subjects, only those who indi­
cated being involved with obtaining good grades were 
selected. That is, the subjects who accepted as their own 
position either statement a, b, or c and rejected at least 
50% of the other statements (see Table 1).
With the establishment of this criterion for the 
selection of subjects, groups of students were given the 
statements until hO students who satisfied the requirements
16
for subjects were obtained. Of the 128 students given the 
statements, 10 ego-involved males, 12 ego-involved females,
1^ non-involved males, and 11 non-involved females were 
found. The first 10 to satisfy the conditions for each 
group were used as subjects with the extra "subjects" being 
kept in reserve in case some of the selected subjects could 
not participate in the experiment. All of the originally 
selected subjects participated.
Solutions and the hedonic scales. Two standard soft 
drinks, 7 Up and quinine water, were used as the pleasant 
and unpleasant solutions respectively. Mace (1966) re­
ported that 7 Up was consistently rated as pleasant and 
quinine water was consistently rated as unpleasant. The 
color of the stimulus solutions was used to induce ex­
pectancies on the part of the subjects. One drop (measured 
from an eyedropper) of either yellow or green food coloring 
per 12 oz. of soft drink gave a distinguishable color to 
either soft drink.
For rating the hedonic qualities of the solutions, 
each subject was given a form composed of 11 horizontal 
lines 150 mm. long. These lines were anchored at one end 
by the term PLEASANT, at the other end by the term 
UNPLEASANT, and in the middle by the phrase NEITHER PLEASANT 
NOR UNPLEASANT (see Appendix A). The first line, which was 
twice as thick as the others, was labeled STANDARD, while 
the remaining lines were consecutively numbered 1 through 10.
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Procedure
The order of presentation of the solutions can he seen 
in Table 2. Mace (1966) reported that there were no dif­
ferences in the ratings of the standard solutions due to 
order of tasting, nor were there any differences in rating 
of the standard solutions due to the sex of the"subject.' 
Although there was no attempt to counterbalance order of 
tasting in the present study, sex was retained as a variable 
in view of the possibility of sex differences in the effect 
of ego-involvement and in the feeling tone reactions as 
separate from the stimulus judgments.
Groups IE and IN both experienced a disconfirmed 
expectancy of pleasantness on the third trial, while Groups 
2E and 2N both experienced a disconfirmed expectancy of 
unpleasantness on the third trial. Groups IE and 2E were 
composed of subjects who were ego-involved with the im­
portance of grades. Groups IN and 2N were composed of 
subjects who were not ego-involved with the importance of 
grades.
The stimulus solutions, as well as the water to be drunk 
between solutions, were kept at constant room temperature. 
Fresh mixtures of solution and fresh water were used each 
day. Subjects received exactly two cubic centimeters of 
solution on each trial but were allowed to drink as much 
water between solutions as they desired. The containers for 
the solutions were white, opaque, half-ounce paper cups.
18
Table 2
Order of Presentation of Solutions
Group Standards Experimental solutions
Trial 1 2 3
IE 11 Qg 7y 11
IN 11 Qg 11 11
2E 11 Qg Qg Qg
2N 11 Qg Qg Qg
Note.--inappropriately colored solutions (disconfirmed 
expectancies) are underlined. The abbreviations used are : 
E--ego-involved group 
N--non-involved group 
7y--7 Up with a yellow color 
7g— 7 Up with a green color 
Qg--quinine with a green color 
Qy--quinine with a yellow color
19
Also, subjects were asked to refrain from smoking during the 
experiment. Subjects participated individually.
Each subject was seated at a desk facing the experi­
menter. Between them there was a row of 10 cups containing 
the solutions. Although only the first three were used in 
the experiment, 10 were displayed to balance for color. In 
front of the row of 10 cups were two cups containing the 
standard solutions.
The name, sex, and coded identification of the appro­
priate experimental group were recorded at the top of the 
rating forms. The following instructions were then given:
As you may or may not know, one of the things 
that we are concerned with in the study of human 
behavior deals with the stable characteristics of 
individual people. That is, because of certain 
characteristics people who respond in one way in 
one situation will respond in a similar way in 
ano ther s i tuation.
One of the things that research in this area 
has shown us is that there is a relationship be­
tween the ability to make sensory discriminations, 
such as being able to recognize the differences in 
tastes, and the ability to make intellectual 
discriminations. By intellectual discriminations,
I'm refering to the ability to recognize the 
differences between alternatives such as the 
different answers on a multiple choice exam in 
college. Of course, the ability to make these 
discriminations directly affects our grades.
The two solutions that are immediately in 
front of you are standard solutions which you 
will use as the basis for your judgments of the 
other solutions. I want you to taste and rate 
each of these two standards on how pleasant or 
unpleasant it tastes to you on this form. Starting 
with this one (7 Up), you may taste or sip these 
standards às often as you need before making your 
rating. However, rinse your mouth with this water 
between solutions so that the taste of one does not 
interfere with the taste of the next one. Make a
20
slight perpendicular slash on the scale line labeled 
standard to indicate your rating of each of these 
solutions.
Each subject was supplied with another rating form, of the 
same design as the one described above. However, the 
second rating form was labeled FEELING TONE (see Ap­
pendix A). The subjects were then told:
On this second rating form, I want you to indi­
cate how pleasant or unpleasant you feel after each 
trial, i.'e., after each tasting of a solution. This 
is because previous research has not made the dis­
tinction between pleasant and unpleasant taste and 
pleasant and unpleasant feelings. For each solution, 
make your rating on the taste form and then make 
your rating on the feeling tone form.
When both of the standard solutions were rated, as well 
as the subject's feeling tone after judging each standard, 
the experimenter (using a ruler) extended the standard 
solution ratings and the standard feeling tone ratings down 
through the remaining scale lines. The subjects were then 
told:
I am extending your ratings of these two 
standard solutions and feeling tone ratings down 
through the other lines so that you will have an 
accurate reference to these when rating the sample 
solutions. For the same reason I am extending your 
ratings of how pleasant you feel at this moment in 
the experiment. You are, of course, free to go 
inside or outside of these lines in your subse­
quent ratings.
These 10 sample solutions are slightly differ­
ent formulations of the standards that you have 
just rated. For each of these, take the entire 
amount in your mouth, hold it there briefly and then 
rate it on the appropriate line below the standard.
Line 1 refers to sample 1, line 2 to sample 1, etc; 
after you have rated each sample on the taste form, 
then rate your general feeling on the other form.
21,
The experiment was terminated for all subjects after 
the third trial rating. They were asked to fill out a 
demand characteristic questionnaire (see Appendix A), were 
told the nature of the experiment, and were asked to re­
frain from telling any other students about the experiment 
because other students were to be used as subjects.
The use of the demand characteristic questionnaire is 
based on the work of Orne (1962). He reported that the 
subject's performance in an experimental situation may be 
conceptualized as problem solving behavior. The subject is 
seeking to become aware of the exact nature of the experi­
ment, and the totality of cues in the experimental situation 
which convey an experimental hypothesis to the subject will 
affect his behavior. Orne termed these cues "the demand 
characteristics of the experimental situation." Therefore, 
an extended questionnaire was used to determine if the sub­
jects formulated a hypothesis which would be the same as or 
similar to the experimental hypothesis.
Any subject who formulated a hypothesis equivalent to 
the experimental one was to have been disqualified. However, 
it was not necessary to discard any subjects on the basis of 
the questionnaire.
This questionnaire also served as an index of credi­
bility. One of the questions that the subjects were asked 
was "Did the thought ever occur to you during the experi­
ment that we were not interested in correlating taste with
22
intellectual ability?” All of the subjects responded ”no” 
to this question, which indicated that they accepted the 
relationship.
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS
The basic problem examined in this study was: Do ego-
involved subjects respond differently than non-involved 
subjects when an expectancy has been disconfirmed in an 
affective judgment situation and, if they do, is the dif­
ference dependent on whether the feeling tone or the 
stimulus characteristics are being evaluated? Therefore, the 
critical comparisons were the third trial ratings of the 
ego-involved subjects with the third trial ratings of the 
non-involved subjects. As can be seen in Table 2, the third 
trial was designed to disconfirm an expectancy of pleasant­
ness (yellow quinine. Groups IE and 1N) or to disconfirm an 
expectancy of unpleasantness (green 7 Up, Groups 2E and 2N).
The rating scale lines were 150 mm. long and the 
standard ratings (ratings without an expectancy) were in­
dicated on each scale line. The differences between the 
third trial ratings and the standard ratings for the same 
solution were determined for each subject, measured in 
millimeters. In recording the rating, change toward the 
pleasant end of the scale was given a plus sign and change
23
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toward the unpleasant end of the scale was given a minus 
sign. As has been previously stated, Mace (1966) reported 
that there were no differences in rating of the standard 
solutions due to order of presentation or sex of subject.
Stimulus Ratings 
The mean ratings of trial 3 were; Group IE (-21.7)5 
Group 2E (+22.9)5 Group IN (-11.3) and Group 2N (+11.5)*
The variances of these groups were: IE (^7*5)5 2E (30.5)5
IN (108.6) and 2N (121.1). Hartley's test for homogeneity 
of variance was applied (Winer, 1962, p. 93) and indicated 
that the degree of hetrogeneity of variance is not large 
enough to invalidate the use of analysis of variance 
(F max = 3*96, £>.05). With the scaling technique used in 
this study, a contrast effect would be indicated by changes 
away from the neutral point of the scale; dissonance would 
be indicated by changes in rating toward the unpleasant end 
of the scale, i.e., with negative changes. The mean changes 
in rating on trial 3' are in the direction of a contrast 
effect. With the method of scoring used in this experiment, 
if a pure contrast effect existed and was not dependent on 
the type of expectancy disconfirmed, the positive and nega­
tive changes in each involvement group would cancel so that 
the mean change for each group would approximate zero and no 
differences between the two groups would show. Therefore, 
an analysis of variance was performed on these change 
scores, reversing the signs of groups IE and IN, and
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separating the data by Involvement, Expectancy, and Sex. As 
can be seen in Table 3? the difference between involvement 
groups yielded a significant F ratio (F = 12.9, £ . X *01).
None of the other differences were significant.
Thus there is a clear indication of a contrast effect 
in the reactions to the stimulus characteristics; the degree 
of the effect depends on the degree of ego-involvement. . 
There is no evidence that the type of expectancy discon­
firmed affects the magnitude of the contrast reaction. The 
very small portion of variance associated with the Involve­
ment X Expectancy interaction indicates that the difference 
between the involvement groups is in no way dependent on 
the type of expectancy disconfirmed.
If dissonance had been present in any detectable degree, 
there would have been significant variation associated with 
either or both the Expectancy (E) factor and the Involvement 
X Expectancy (I x E) interaction. Therefore, as can be seen 
by comparing Figure 2 with Figure 1, there seems to be a 
relatively pure contrast effect in the hedonic ratings of the 
stimulus chàracteristics.
Although the significance of the Involvement (I) factor 
indicates that the ego-involved group changed more than the 
non-involved group, it does not indicate whether or not the 
changes in the non-involved groups were significant. There­
fore, t tests were performed on the means for Groups IN and 
2N. As can be seen in Table 4, both of these rating changes
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance of Changes in Stimulus 
Rating on Trial .3, Reversing the 
Signs of Groups IE and 1N
Source SS df MS
Involvement (I) 1188.1 1 1188.1
Expectancy (E) 5.0 1 5.0
Sex (S) l4.^ 1 14.4
(I)x(E) 2.5 1 2.5
(I)x(8) 1.9 1 1.9
(E)x(S) .9 1 .9
(Dx(E)x(S) 3.8 1 3.8
Error 2944.0 32 92.0
F £
12.9 <.01
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Fig. 2. Obtained changes on the stimulus ratings. 
Abbreviations used are:
SP— standard pleasant rating 
SU— standard unpleasant rating 
DP— disconfirmed pleasant expectancy 
DU— disconfirmed unpleasant expectancy
were significantly different from the standard ratings, in­
dicating that disconfirmation of an expectancy produces a 
contrast effect even in non-involved subjects.
Table 4
Significance of Changes in Non-involved 
Groups on the Stimulus Ratings
Group
IN
2N
Comparison Means 
(-11.3) vs (0) 
(+11.5) vs (0)
t
2.8
2,h
R
<.05
(.05
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Feeling Tone Ratings 
The changes In feeling tone ratings were obtained In 
the same manner as described above for the changes In ratings 
for the solutions. The mean ratings on this scale after a 
disconfirmed expectancy were; Group IE (-37*1), Group 2E 
(+29.0), Group 1N (-8.3)5 &nd Group 2N (+6.4). The 
variances of these groups were; IE (72.3)5 2E (89.8), 1N 
(21.6)5 and 2N (59*4). Agaln5 Hartley's test for homogeneity 
of variance was applied and Indicated that the degree of 
hetrogeneity of variance Is not large enough to Invalidate 
the use of analysis of variance (Fmax = 4.155 £^*05)* An 
analysis of variance was performed on these change scores, 
reversing the signs of Groups IE and IN, and separating the 
data by Involvement, Expectancy, and Sex. As can be seen In 
Table 5, the Involvement factor yielded a significant F - 
ratio (F = 60.1, £. (.01). As with the analysis of the 
stimulus ratings, the Involvement factor (I) was the only 
significant one. However, the F ratio for the Expectancy 
factor (E) showed some variation. To the extent that this 
non-significant variation Is meaningful. It would Indicate 
some tendency for the type of expectancy disconfirmed to 
Influence the amount of change In ratings. Inspection of 
the four group means shows that changes toward the un­
pleasant end of the scale were somewhat larger than those 
toward the pleasant end. This would be consistent with a 
small dissonance effect (see Figure 1). There Is, therefore,
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Table 5
Analysis of Variance of Peeling Tone Changes 
in Rating on Trail 3, Reversing 
signs of Groups 1E and 1N
Source SS df MS I £
Involvement (I) 660^.1 1 6604.1 60.1 <.01
Expectancy (E) 273.0 1 273.0 2.3 NS
Sex (S) 22.7 22.7
(I)x(E) 95.^ 1 95.4
(I)x(S) 1^.8 1 14.8
(E)x(S) 5.2 1 5.2
(I)x(E)x(S) 7.1 1 7.1
Error 3493.2 32 110.0
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some reason to suspect that, although the major effect in 
the feeling tone ratings is a contrast effect, there may be 
a small, but not statistically significant dissonance 
effect. The Involvement x Expectancy (I X E) interaction 
again produces slightly less than chance variation,.so there 
seems to be no evidence that the two involvement groups are 
reacting differently as far as the contrast-dissonance 
combination is concerned.
Again, the appropriate t tests were performed to de­
termine whether or not the mean changes in rating of the 
non-involved groups were significant. As can be seen in 
Table 6, neither comparison showed a significant difference. 
Thus lack of involvement reduces feeling tone changes to non­
significance while the presence of ego-involvement boosts 
feeling tone changes to a highly significant level.
Inspection of the feeling tone means indicated a 
possible stronger reaction with a disconfirmed pleasant 
experience than with a disconfirmed unpleasant experience.
As can be seen in Table 7, the mean of Group 1E was sig­
nificantly different from the mean of Group 2E (p<.05)j 
while the difference between the means for Groups IN and 2N 
was not significant. Although this is actually an (I)x(E) 
interaction test, it is somewhat more informative than the 
(I)x(E) interaction in the analysis of variance. The latter, 
which would ordinarily indicate whether or not an interaction 
was present, is in fact a purified term from which the
Table 6
Significance of Changes in Non-involved Groups 
on Feeling tone Scale
Group Comparison Means t £
IN (-8.3) vs (0) 1 A >.10
2N (+6A) vs (0) 1.07 >.10
Table 7
Comparison of Inter-group Means
on Feeling tone Scale
Groups Comparison Means t £
IE vs 2E (37.1) vs (29.0) 1.92 <.05
IN vs 2N (8.3) vs (6A) .9 -
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effects of the overall expectancy factor and the involvement 
factor have been removed. The expectancy factor was ap­
proaching significance. The jb test, which leaves the 
expectancy factor confounded with the interaction effect, 
allows them to combine to show a small significant effect.
Thus the analysis of the feeling tone ratings shows a 
strong contrast effect, with probably a small amount of 
dissonance, for the ego-involved groups. For the non- 
involved groups, the changes were in the same direction as 
for the ego-involved groups, but were not significant.
Figure 3 shows a graphic representation of these effects.
UNPLEASANT
-)+0 -30 -20 -10
Standard
Ratings
0 0 10 20
PLEASANT 
30 40
Group IN Group 2N
DP SU
Group IE
SP
Group 2E
DU
Fig. 3. Obtained rating changes on feeling tone scale, 
Abbreviations used are:
SU— standard unpleasant rating 
SP— standard pleasant rating 
DP— disconfirmed pleasant experience 
DU— disconfirmed unpleasant experience 
c— presumed pure contrast effect 
d— presumed small dissonance effect
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Summary
Of the hypotheses stated earlier in this report, the 
first, that the effect is a contrast effect and that ego- 
involvement simply increases the strength of the effect, is 
clearly supported for the stimulus ratings and is clearly 
the major factor on the feeling tone ratings. No support 
for hypothesis two was found. Some small partial support 
was found for hypothesis three, that dissonance applies only 
to judgments involving personal feelings of commitment.
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION
The third trial rating changes in this experiment 
demonstrate that the subjects experienced a contrast effect 
when their expectancies were disconfirmed. If a person 
expects an experience to be pleasant and it is unpleasant, 
he perceives it as being more unpleasant than if he had no 
basis for an expectancy. If he expects an experience to be 
unpleasant and it is pleasant, he perceives it as being 
more pleasant than if he had no basis for an expectancy. 
These results are in line with those reported by this author 
in an earlier study (Mace, 1966). The results obtained in 
the present study gave no evidence of a dissonance effect on 
the stimulus ratings, although there is some indication of a 
small dissonance effect on the feeling tone scale.
The present study also showed that if a subject is ego- 
involved, he will experience a significantly stronger con­
trast effect than a subject who is not involved in the 
situation. Also, the pattern of judgment is quite 
symmetrical on the stimulus ratings. That is, the contrast 
effect to the stimulus characteristics did not depend on
3^
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the expectancy which was disconfirmed. The contrast effect 
with a disconfirmed pleasant experience was of the same in­
tensity as the contrast effect with a disconfirmed 
■unpleasant experience. There were no differences in male 
and female subjects in terms of the intensity or direction 
of the reaction.
Sherif and Hovland offer a framework for assimilation 
and contrast effects in attitude change. In referring to 
the anchors that individuals use in making judgments, they 
state, "The use of anchors within the stimulus series is 
functionally equivalent to the use of a standard stimulus in 
classical psychophysical methods (1961, p. 5l )• The 
standard solutions used in the present experiment can be 
viewed as the anchors from which judgments of succeeding 
solutions were made.
According to Sherif and Hovland, an anchor acts as a 
reference from which the determination of either an assimi­
lation or contrast effect is made when viewing succeeding 
judgments. If the stimulus is perceived as being similar to 
the anchor, there is a tendency to draw the judgment closer 
to the anchor, i.e. to assimilate toward the anchor. On 
the other hand, if the stimulus is perceived as being dis­
similar to the anchor, a contrast effect occurs and the 
judgment is pushed farther away from the anchor.
Sherif and Hovland postulate two forces as potentially 
.-aff.eeting each judgment; a contrast effect to push the
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rating away from its respective anchor and an assimilation 
effect to pull the rating toward its respective anchor.
In the present study, when an expectancy was discon­
firmed, such a contrast effect was indicated by the ratings 
being significantly beyond their respective anchors and 
toward the extremes of the scale.
Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergal (1965? P* ^0) state that 
a number of recent studies (Unshaw, 1962; Webb & Chueh,
1962; Zavalloni & Cook, 1963), as well as their own research, 
indicate that an individual who is ego-involved will tend to 
have a stronger contrast effect than non-involved indi­
viduals. The above research is primarily dealing with 
discrepant communication in the pattern of attitudes and 
attitude change. An individual who is highly ego-involved 
in an attitude will tend to view any communication that is 
not similar to his own position in an exaggerated contrast 
reaction when compared with judgments of people who are 
relatively non-involved (Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965,
p. 236-237).
The same type of phenomenon seems to be occurring in 
the present experiment. That is, the ego-involved subject 
showed a stronger or exaggerated contrast effect when their 
expectancies were disconfirmed, compared to the non-involved 
subjects. The perception of the disconfirmed expectancy can 
be conceived of as a form of communication. That is, the 
individual is receiving some information about the
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situation. Apparently, those who are ego-lnvolveâ perceive 
this information as being more discrepant from their anchor 
or reference than those who are not involved.
Feeling Tone Analysis 
The analysis of the feeling tone ratings indicate that 
there is also a strong contrast effect in feeling tone for 
ego-involved subjects, but no significant change in feeling 
tone for non-involved subjects when an expectancy is dis­
confirmed. However, this analysis indicated a difference 
in intensity of the reaction, depending on which expectancy 
was disconfirmed. That is, if an individual expects an 
experience to be pleasant and it is unpleasant, the magnitude 
of his unpleasant feeling is greater than the magnitude of 
his pleasant feeling when he expects an experience to be 
unpleasant and it is pleasant. This could indicate a combi­
nation of dissonance and contrast. The contrast effect tends 
to pull the ratings toward the extremes, while a dissonance 
effect tends to pull the ratings toward the unpleasant end 
of the scale. As can be seen in line 3 of Figure 1, a com­
bination effect would follow a pattern such as that of the 
ego-involved subjects' ratings on the feeling tone scale.
That is, the disconfirmed pleasant reaction would be quite 
large, since both contrast and dissonance would be pulling 
the rating toward the unpleasant end of the scale. The 
disconfirmed unpleasant reaction would be significantly 
smaller than the disconfirmed pleasant reaction because the
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contrast effect would be pulling the rating toward the 
pleasant end of the scale while the dissonance effect would 
be pulling the rating toward the unpleasant end of the scale.
Some support is given to the idea of a possible combi­
nation effect by the results of Mace (1966). The contrast 
reaction reported there in a disconfirmed expectancy situa­
tion also shows that the disconfirmed pleasant reaction 
appeared to yield a larger mean change in rating than the 
disconfirmed unpleasant reaction. The means reported are: 
disconfirmed pleasant (-22.k) and disconfirmed unpleasant 
(+8.6). A t test comparing these two means indicates a 
significant difference between the two ratings 
it = 1.92, £ .05). In that study, the subjects were not
asked to differentiate between their reaction to the 
stimulus and their feeling tone. It seems quite possible 
that a significant proportion of subjects were rating their 
feeling tone rather than their reaction to the stimulus.
Failure to Find Dissonance on the Stimulus Ratings
In the study of Carlsmith and Aronson (1963) there was 
a possible confounding variable operating. In having each 
subject guess whether the solution would be sweet or.bitter, 
they attempted to increase his motivation for guessing 
correctly, by paying him $.50 for each correct guess and 
charging him $1.00 for each incorrect guess. It seems pos­
sible that this factor of gain or loss of money may have 
influenced the perception of their subjects.
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Wien a subject guessed wrong, he lost $1 .00 and had 
previously been told that he could keep the amount of money 
that he ended up winning. If he guessed wrong, he realized 
it as soon as he started to taste the solution. His per­
ception would seem to be that he had both guessed wrong on 
the nature of the solution and also had lost $1.00.
In viewing this possible influence, Carlsmith and 
Aronson state:
The difference between being correct and being 
incorrect with no expectancy gives an estimate of 
the effects of being wrong and losing money. But 
the crucial comparison is between being incorrect 
with an expectancy (disconfirmation) and being 
incorrect without an expectancy (incorrect) (1963, 
p. 15^).
However, this analysis does not consider a possible 
confounding effect. Even though their results showed sig­
nificant differences between being incorrect with an 
expectancy and being incorrect without an expectancy, this 
does not eliminate the possible influence of money. ' The 
fact that they expected to win $.50 and then lost $1.00 
when an expectancy was disconfirmed may have left the 
subjects in a psychologically negative state which affected 
their ratings. When the subject was incorrect without an 
expectancy, he did not expect to win any money. When he 
was incorrect, he was not disappointed over the loss of 
money. It seems quite possible that the "dissonance" 
reaction of these subjects was not so much with the
1+0
disconfirmation of an expectancy as with the realization 
that they had just lost money.
Conclusions
The conclusions that can be drawn from this study are:
1. If in a hedonic judgment situation individuals' 
expectancies are disconfirmed, they will experience a con­
trast effect based on the stimulus characteristics.
2. The magnitude of this contrast effect will be sig­
nificantly stronger if they are ego-involved in the situation.
3. If they are ego-involved in the situation, they will 
also experience a strong contrast effect based on their 
personal feeling tone. However, if they are relatively non- 
involved, there will be no significant change in their 
feeling tone with a disconfirmed expectancy.
Cognitive dissonance is not a major factor in their 
reactions in this situation. There is some evidence for a 
small dissonance effect in the feeling tone reactions of 
individuals who are ego-involved in the situation.
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APPENDIX A
RATING SCALES 
QUESTIONNAIRE
^3
STANDARD
UNPLEASANT NEITHER PLEASANT PLEASANT
'NOR UNPLEASANT
1 . 
2 . 
3.
5.
6 .
7.
8.
9.
10.
UNPLEASANT
STANDARD
^5
FEELING TONE
NEITHER PLEASANT 
NOR UNPLEASANT
PLEASANT
1 . 
2 . 
3.
5.
6 .
7.
8.
9.
1 0 .
î+6
Please answer the following questions.
What did you think that we were after in this experiment?
Did you suspect anything about the experiment?
Did you suspect anything about the solutions?
Why do you think that you were given solutions that did not 
have the same colors as the standards?
Did the thought ever occur to you during the experiment that 
we were not interested in correlating taste with intellectual 
discriminatory ability?
Did anything or any idea that you had influence where you 
placed your marks on the rating scales?
If so, what was the idea?
APPENDIX B
RAW DATA
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Raw Data
Group Sex
Third Trial 
Stimulus Ratings
Third Trial 
Feeling Tone Ratings
IE . M -16 -4l
M -23 -36
M -24 -32
M -31 -26
M -13 -54
F -25 -29
F -15 -38
F -23 -42
F -19 -27
F -2& . -46
2E M 23 28
M 28 16
M 24 33
M 15 24
M 18 48
F 33 56
F 26 37
F 19 12
F 27 19
F 16 17
IN M — 16 - 5
M -11 - 3
M 7 - 6
M -15 -11
M -24 -14
F -15 - 6
F -21 -18
F 9 - 3
F -10 -10
F -17 - 7
1^ 9
Group Sex
Third Trial 
Stimulus Ratings
Third Trial 
Feeling Tone Ratings
2N M 7 .
M - 9
M 21 2
M 6 if
M 20 9
F - 9 22
F 17 5
F 23 3
F 14- -11
F 18 9
